A social analysis of an elite constellation: the case of Formula 1
1: Introduction
From its inception in the early 20 th century thinking of Pareto, Michels and Mosca, elite theory has focused fundamentally on its political connections and dynamics (Woods 1998; Scott 1982; . In this way, the term elite blended into that of the 'ruling class', and the fundamental question for researchers studying elites was the extent to which their existence challenged democratic and pluralist politics. It was in this spirit that C. Wright Mills (1956) couched his famous critique of the 'power elite'. It is also in these terms that John Scott has adopted Weberian perspectives to insist on the significance of 'command' for delineating elites, thus differentiating them from social classes. Pierre Bourdieu's (1985, and see Hjellbrekke et al 2011; Flemmen 2012; conception of 'fields of power' also insists on the way that elites are defined through their capacity to mobilise exclusive networks. This approach led methodologically to an emphasis on elite power networks, and to the enduring persistence of elite formations who interlock through their social capital.
Over the past 10 years, and influenced in particular by Savage and Williams's (2008) call for a renewal of elite studies, the focus has shifted towards the more dynamic world of financial elites. Here, elite theory draws on the growing interests in the 'super rich' (Irvin 2008; Volschoa and Kelly 2012; Burrows 2013) , the 'one percent' (Dorling 2014; Stiglitz 2011) , and the 'global capitalist class' (Sklair 2003) . Theoretically, the implication is that older forms of elite analysis might overstate the coherence and consistency of elite power networks, such as those embedded in interlocking corporate directorships (Froud et al 2008) .
It is sometimes the limits of elite co-ordination which is the focus of attention (e.g. Engelen et al 2012) . This current picks up on the recent theoretical insistence that neo-liberal economic forces can be effective even in the absence of conscious mobilising and networking amongst distinctive power elites.
The analysis of elites therefore now oscillates between those arguing for the power of neoliberal, financial elites against those reinstating the significance of elite social networks and the remaking of 'power elites'. Owen Jones's (2014) recent restatement that there is an 'Establishment' in Britain is an arresting restatement of the older perspective. The aim of our paper, using a detailed case study of the Formula 1 industry, is to argue that we need to broaden to a 'social analysis'. Although the significance of political and financial elites is not in doubt, we also need to recognise a wider 'elite constellation'. We should not categorise elites as singular or unitary phenomena, but identify the co-existence of a range of different elite agents. In the case of F1, we argue for the power of a distinctive 'technical elite' which is the product of a long history of craft, skill, and technical expertise (see more broadly, Savage 2010 ). This allows us to recognise that elites are complex social formations which straddle different arenas, and we wish to bring the technical elements more fully into play so that they can more effectively intersect with the role of finance and politics.
This argument about elite constellations is not simply insisting on complexity. It also directs us to theoretically insist that time and temporality is central to elite formation. In a similar vein to Cresswell's (2010) notion 'constellations of mobility' in his discussion of movement and place, we stress the importance of tracing the impact of the past on the present, historical and geographical specificity, and attention to forms of immobility. Older political conceptions of elites emphasise the persistence of upper class networks, whereas newer financialised approaches tend to see elites as the product of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. We argue that the F1 technical elite is neither simply the product of recent neoliberal financialised capitalism, nor marked by long term elite persistence. Drawing on the arguments of Bourdieu and Piketty, we will argue that they are embedded within a long-term process of accumulation which is distinctive to the F1 engineering industry.
Our paper proceeds by outlining why F1 offers an unusual -but strategically essentialvantage point for thinking about elites more generally. We then consider theoretically how we build temporality into our understanding of the formation of elite constellations, through our analysis of accumulation. We show how the F1 industry itself embeds a distinct model of accumulation in which extreme speed and intensity is dependent on prior temporal accretion.
This metaphor directs us to move away from the superficial world towards a deeper and longer term understanding of elite constellations. In the final part of this paper we report a systematic analysis of the F1 technical elite, based on an exhaustive study of senior figures within the teams. We show how this group forms a distinctive technical, engineering and meritocratic elite -yet which is also exclusive and deploys powerful elite practices.
Our study is based on a detailed reading of key sources relevant to the F1 industry, and the construction of a database on the chief engineers, managers and directors in six British F1
teams. The teams themselves vary in size, organisational structure and position titles, which means the identification of the most senior members is not straightforward. Manager. In addition to the 43 individuals derived this way, seven other recent and renowned employees were included on the grounds of their importance to and seniority within the industry, the wealth of data available, and on the condition that they had left the team no earlier than 2012. The status of the industry and of many of the teams' senior management allowed data to be collected in the public domain, through the biographies on the teams' websites, in media publications and the website LinkedIn. Information was collected on position; age; nationality; place of birth; schooling; university education; degree subject; number of years in F1; career progression; salary and hobbies and interests. This extensive prosopographical data base was cross checked (where possible) from a range of different sources.
2: Formula 1 as a critical case study
Formula 1 is a critical case study because it is a hugely successful part of the British economy, valued at £6.3 billion to £8.2 billion (Allen 2015; . 1 Over the past 15 years, the industry's total revenue has reached £11.1 billion, surpassing the £9.9 billion of its closest rival the FIFA World Cup of soccer (Sylt 2015) . The total annual spending of all teams in 2015 was estimated at £1.9 billion, an average budget of £194 million (Walthert 2015) . Revenue in 2013 was £1.16 million and profit was £308 million . F1 directly employs 6,000 people, who in turn work with a large network of motorsport suppliers -the Williams team used 3,000 UK companies alone in a six year period (Heaton 2011 List with a net worth of £110 million. But he hardly exemplifies F1 today.
By contrast, there is a clear warrant for the significance of finance, most notably through the key figure of (recently ousted) Bernie Ecclestone, the current CEO of Formula One Group and business magnate, who has played the key role in placing F1 on the global stage (Ciolfi & Stuart, 2013 We fully recognize the significance of finance, and glamour, in the success of F1. However, we want to contest that these themes are adequate. These images of elite-ness are simplistic, dated visions which do not apply to the industry in a straightforward way, nor do they adequately allow us to understand the industry as an elite constellation. Instead, we argue for the need to recognise the significance of a distinctly 'technical elite'. This allows us to go behind the superficial imagery and media saturated stories of specific individuals or glamorous sites to recognize the power of an elite habitus which is a major part of the industry. In the next part of this paper, we theoretically sketch out what this argument entails.
3: The formation of elite constellations: accumulation, embodiment and labour
Our approach to elite constellations argues against for the co-existence of different elite motifs and does not conflate elites with a distinctive occupational profile, income boundaries (such as the 1%), or a set of ascriptive characteristics. We see elite formation as part of a longer term historical process in which its boundaries with a more privileged professional and managerial middle class are porous and pliable. We avoid a language of demarcation and clear boundaries, and instead understand process and dynamics which need to be unravelled over time. Our starting point is Bourdieu's argument:
The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labour (in its materialized form or its 'incorporated,' embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor. (Bourdieu 1986: 241) In pursuing this argument, Piketty's emphasis on the longer term gestation of capital is a vital intervention (see also Savage 2014; Piketty 2014b). Understanding social classes as the product of capital, as forces in the process of 'becoming', as dependent on prior investment, provides a more sophisticated way of explicating elites as a dynamic and mutable force. This point leads us to refuse the conventional economists' standard distinction between returns to capital and labour and reifying them into distinctive social classes (e.g. Wright 2014).
Heuristically, Piketty, within the spirit if not the letter of Bourdieu, ambitiously prefers to see returns to capital as linked to accumulated historical return and returns to labour as linked to current activity (see generally Savage 2014) . As labourers, we have to go out to work each day afresh -we cannot rest on our laurels 2 . Returns to (economic) capital however accumulate on an historical basis, and it is this longer term accumulation which is central for elite formation.
This moves away from the standard sociological move of seeing elites largely in terms of their social and political ascribed characteristics in which it is their social networks, their membership of particular families, clubs, and so on which constitute them as elite. It also avoids the tendency to treat them simply as the reflexes of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism, as if there is no longer term history implicated in the in the formation of elites and economies of glamour. By contrast, a concern with accumulation allows us to explore the complex dynamics of the accumulation process avoiding the categorical separation of people into different camps, and which more effectively renders elites as agents of change. Piketty's analysis of economic capital shows how those with more to invest earn higher rates of return than those with less to invest. There is thus a structural process, which he shows most directly with respect to the endowments of American elite universities which allows those who have most, to gain most, not only in absolute but also in relative terms. We can thus see how reward and advantage can be built into the organisation of markets and fields and come to have striking outlier effects at the top end which permit those at this top end to enjoy 'Matthew effects' where 'to those who have, more shall be given' (see Ingham 2005, and more generally Savage et al 2015) .
It is vital to detach our argument about accumulation from economistic logics of 'investment' which imply an individualistic frame of reference. This includes standard arguments about the significance of 'human capital' which is the most usual way of justifying privilege from within a neo-classical economic framing. Both Piketty and Bourdieu join forces in resisting this argument because they see it as assuming that individual motivation, skill, hard work and endeavour is solely responsible for wealth. For Piketty, the 'human capital hypothesis' is 'largely illusory'.
There is little evidence that labor's share in national income has increased significantly…. 'nonhuman' capital seems almost as indispensable in the 21 st century as it was in the eighteenth or nineteenth. (Piketty 2014: 22) Although Piketty is not a Marxist, his Marxisant refusal to use the concept of human capital and his preference for delineating 'labour', and above all his concern with temporality, is telling. Bourdieu (1986) makes a similar move in focusing on cultural, rather than human capital. Because cultural capital exists in three related forms, embodied, objectified, and institutionalised, he thus resists seeing it as a purely a self-investment and draws attention to the wider context in which cultural capital can be activated into producing advantages.
Here, the arguments of the German Marxists Kluge and Negt (2015) have considerable resonance, as they are conducting an exercise for labour which parallels Piketty's for capital, in drawing attention to the power of the past over the current. In their interpretation of Marx 'the bulk of dead labour in a modern society is superior to living labour' (Kluge and Negt 2015: 129 century is an arresting exemplification. For Joyce this process involved the moulding of subjectivities and personalities through minute devices, ranging from the practice of writing and filing, through to the ritualistic bodily drills and routines imparted at private schools and the Oxbridge college. The British elite was therefore neither a gentlemanly residue nor a pure meritocratic formation but a distinctive assemblage implicated, in Bourdieu's terms, in a distinctive elite habitus which could be historically persistent.
It is in this spirit that we approach our F1 elite. As we have explained above, we do not think that the kind of gentlemanly habitus which Joyce excavates has such significance today. But we do not think either that characterising the industry's leading figures as the product of neoliberal financialised capital is enough either. The historical plate has not been wiped entirely
clean. We instead demonstrate how the F1 elite is an historical extension of a distinctive technical and engineering idiom which has also been an important feature of post war British social change more generally (Savage 2010) . Standing in contrast to the gentlemanly world of professional expertise, these technical skills embraced cultures of skilled craft work alongside professional expertise and became increasingly instantiated into the practices of information technology and communication. Our argument will be that we can only understand the F1 elite as the obstinate crystallisation of this technical ecology.
4: Accumulation and the long durée in F1
On the face of it, it may appear strange to claim that F1 is characterised by long periods of accumulation. It is renowned as an environment of turbulence, immediacy and extreme innovation. Media reports portray a world of short-termism and instability. The car itself billion from share sales and dividend payments, partly funded by a recapitalisation in July 2014 which increased F1's debt by £2.6 billion (Clancy 2014) . This made it one of the private equity firm's best-performing investments. Although CVC 'typically targets a three to five year investment holding period', it held F1 for far longer than usual as a result .
With the term of the fund being 10 years, and concerns over Ecclestone's role in the sport, In addition, the two other teams deemed historically important and who also have permanent places on the rule-making F1 strategy group -Mercedes and Williams -each get payments of around £20.5 million (Benson 2014) . Table 1 approximates the amount each team received in prize money from the Formula One Group in 2013. This system of prize money thus rewards not just merit, but merit over time and -moreoverthe importance of historical relationships. The similarity of the prize money received to the size and budgets of the teams is striking.
Team budgets and prize money 2014 (Phillips 2015)
In essence, it means that the teams' main source of income is premised upon a model of accumulation through time, which advantages the older, more successful and larger teams to the detriment, it is argued, of the smaller, less successful competitors. This income in turn prompts both future success and higher income from other sources, such as sponsorship and merchandise. Further to this, the increasing costs of technological advance in high-tech hybrid power units contributes to the 'widening chasm between the haves and have-nots' . The game, the smaller teams argue, is rigged (Oliver and Allen 2015) . In 2015 two teams, Force India and Sauber, lodged a complaint with the European Union about F1's governance and prize money distribution (Esler 2015) .
These long term rhythms in finance are centred on Motor Sport Valley, the home of F1, which is the spatial materialisation of temporal accumulation. Looking closer at the industry, the production of speed itself is the result of long term accumulation. The industry is highly future-orientated, with careful long-term planning in terms of design and manufacture. Even in the midst of the economic downturn, motorsportbased businesses spent 30% of their turnover on R&D to stay ahead of the competition, compared to 4% in engineering, 6% in automotive and 15% in pharmaceuticals (Barretto 2013) . Top teams can spend well over £68 million on research and development (Miller 2013) . Red Bull's biggest cost in 2013 was R&D spending -£83 million, up 10% from the previous year. This represents 42% of their total budget of £197 million, the boost in their fortunes being the result of prize money awarded for the previous season .
'This sport is innovation, innovation costs money, a lot of investment, and long-term But whilst F1 is dependent on the long durée of planning and sustaining capabilities in R&D, funding and infrastructure, those in the industry attribute success and speed above all to the embodied expertise of its employees. As Solitander and Solitander (2010) argue, the fiercest competition is not on the track, but for the accumulation of knowledge and expertise. Some designers, as in the case of Adrian Newey, are considered so valuable that the teams will pay $10.2 million (£7 million) in salary for their services (FIA transcript 2007: 20) .
'Back in the mid-'80s and '90s you could prioritise the technology and just forget the This hard-won and time-worn form of tacit knowledge, on which scientific experiments and technical innovations often depend, Pinch and Henry (1999) argue, tends to emerge from 'sets of people who have undertaken long periods of apprenticeship and are integrated into networks of contacts' (Pinch and Henry 1999: 673 ).
Theoretically we can therefore see F1 as exemplifying how the production of rapid speed is dependent on prior investments -of funds, R&D resources, infrastructure, and human skill and expertise. We have a frame in which we can see how the capacity to reap rewards in the present is dependent on prior activity. It is actually premised on forms of immobility. The 'pulse' of immediacy, of glamour and the libidinal part of a wider time ecology. It is through understanding the temporality of these accumulation processes that we can unravel how elites are not produced simply from contingencies but have a much longer process lying behind them. This is entirely consistent with Piketty's emphasis on how capital, as the sum of historical processes of accumulation, always exceeds the present, and indeed increasingly so as the stock of capital builds up. Let us explicate this point by looking further at the specific characteristics of those in the most senior positions within F1 teams.
5: The F1 'technical elite'
As a highly successful industry, the annual income levels of F1 employees are high, ranging from approximately £14,000 -£140,000 for mechanics and engineers; £270,000 -£6.8 million for managers, chief engineers and directors, even leaving aside the special case of up to £22 million for drivers. With exact information hard to come by, the total spend on pay for relying on money made inside the sport. Those doing technical jobs are less well paid, apart from Adrian Newey (who reportedly turned down a salary offer of £20 million to work for Ferrari) but even so fit very easily indeed into the top 1% of earners. The lowest confirmed salary we have found is for Wood, and this £200k is probably at the lower range of any in our database. In short, this is clearly a highly economically advantaged group. Jenkins et al (2009) , 'they have learned through experience and the 'school of hard-knocks' and therefore they have tended to develop ad hoc practices for managing their organisations' (Jenkins et al 2009: 883) . Table 2 father's work and interests: "My father was also an engineer and worked for a company that made paper-making machines. He had a lathe, so we were always building bits and pieces". ("Rob Marshall, Red Bull Racing" 2016) We can be more precise about the nature of these trajectories (see Table 2 ). In six cases (trajectory 1) an early career as driver provides an entrée into the industry. Sometimes, as with Fernley, this was part of a distinctive racer-mechanic trajectory, though in other cases, as with Niki Lauda, drivers came from privileged backgrounds. Leaving aside these drivers, we see only three cases of this F1 elite being able to pursue an engineering route without a university degree (route 6). These patterns of university attendance are not typically 'academic' profiles. Instead they are associated with the idiom of 'passion' and 'getting the bug', where entry to university comes after initial interests in motor sport and engineering. They have a habitus associated with motor sports, i.e. not global exchangeable skills but highly specific and focused expertise.
Most of the elite have a strong interest in engineering or mechanics (or, though often at a later date, racing) from young age. They commit their leisure time to pursuing these hobbies and are often willing to work lowly jobs in garages or at the race track for free .
It follows that this elite is highly networked amongst each other. They have intense social capital and networks arising from years in the industry (and related industries). This accumulation of social capital engenders success. Smith (2012) discusses responses in F1 to innovation and change, which he refers to as 'technological discontinuities'. So called 'competence enhancing' discontinuities involve technologies which build on existing techniques, know-how and an established knowledge base (Smith 2012, 334) . 'Competencedestroying' technological discontinuities, on the other hand, occur with the introduction of technologies that are so fundamentally different from existing ones that much of the accumulated expertise that has been built up over many years rapidly becomes obsolete (334). In his discussion of one such competence-destroying discontinuity -'something that is comparatively rare even in a technology-led sector like Formula 1' -Smith shows that the designer John Barnard was able to revolutionise chassis technology by making the leap to carbon fibre because of his accumulated social capital. Barnard had a large and eclectic network of leading designers and team owners in F1, contacts in aeronautics and other motorsport industries, and other categories of racing that were technologically and geographically distant from F1. Able to draw on these contacts for knowledge, he thus gave his team, McLaren, a stark advantage over a rival, Lotus, who were also pursuing carbon fibre, but through methods borrowed directly from the existing aluminium chassis technology (Smith 2012: 336, 346) .
6: Conclusion
Pulling together the threads of this paper, we make three major points. Firstly, and most descriptively, we have extended the sociological gaze to bring into view a technical elite, at the forefront of a successful and dynamic industry, yet which we have also argued needs to be understood historically and is not readily captured by current sociological motifs. At the apex of all the British teams we see a distinctive crystallisation of a technical habitus, strongly embedded in the industry, and exemplifying intense passions and dedications.
This descriptive point is important but we want to make two further analytical points on the back of it. Secondly, we have deliberately sought to problematize any clear categorical distinction between a distinctive elite and non-elite formation. Or, to put this another way, we need to see elite formation as bound up with wider processes affecting the upper levels of the social structure and not simply a small 1% or some such. Excavating this group takes us away from the very small 'super-rich' towards a more messy assemblage of an 'elite constellation'.
This has the further implication of disrupting a certain populist discourse which pits a small group at the top against a large majority. In fact, privilege and accumulation stretch well into the ranks of the upper middle classes.
In elaborating this emphasis on an elite constellation, we argue for the significance of time and accumulation. Here we seek to disrupt the 'human capital' discourse which lies behind a narrow meritocratic view which might justify large rewards. Reframing this within a wider recognition of accumulation on Bourdieu's and Piketty's model means instead that human capital only signifies within a wider ecology in which specific skills and capacities come to earn rewards. In Bourdieusian terms, we need to recognise the institutionalised and objectified, as well as embodied qualities which are implicated in forms of accumulation.
This is why we have tried to bring out how the technical elite are in a certain way embedded within the industry itself, and to understand their advantages we need to place them within this wider historical and spatial context. Elites are thereby constituted through long term processes of accumulation. Making this point shifts argument away from debates about human capital, and high salaries and bonuses being a just reward for endeavour within spotmarkets. It focuses attention on wider historical processes by which an entire ecology comes to prize and funnels certain capacities and skills. This is where Kluge and Negt's insistence on historical obstinacy -even in these neo-liberal and global times -is so important.
The accumulation emphasis helps in a further analytical way. It makes us realise that the most advantaged are not categorically different from other social groups, who also draw on certain kinds of capital, but instead should be understood as those who can maximise such advantages. Economically, as Piketty has shown, the return to capital increases proportionately as one's total amount of capital increases. This generates non-linear or outlier effects at the top within the context of 'winner take all markets'.
